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In Vitro Fertilization and Ethical Dualism 
Brian V. Johnstone, C.SS.R. 
Father Johnstone, an associate professor of moral theology at the 
Catholic Un iversity of A merica, studied theology at St. Mary's Seminary, 
Ballarat, Australia, at the Anselmianum in Rome, at the Universities of 
Bonn and Tuebigen, and at the Catholic University of Louvainfrom which 
he received his doctorate in 1973. 
The procedure of in vitro fertilization and embryo transfer has become 
an established and widely accepted method of overcoming some forms of 
infertility. This article will be concerned with some of the ethical issues 
which have been raised. These relate to two areas above all: those touching 
on the value of life and those related to the values of human sexuality, 
marriage and parenthood. Under the first heading would come the very 
serious problems raised by the loss of human embryos, the discarding or 
deliberate destruction of embryos, experimentation upon them and 
abortion of defectives. These questions have been raIsed in particular form 
by recent government appointed committees in some countries. I Since this 
range of issues would require an extensive analysis in their own right, I will 
not attempt to deal with them here. 2 Attention will be focused on the 
seCORd set of values. The precise question to be addressed will be: how are 
IYF and ET to be assessed ethically from the perspectiv of the Christian 
and, in particular, the Roman Catholic tradition on the meaning of human 
sexuality, marriage and parenthood? I propose to review a number of 
significant contributions to the debate which have emerged from within 
the tradition. Such a review will indicate how these issues have been 
treated, the presuppositions and the significant developments in ethical 
thinking which the debate has occasioned . 
The inseparability of the unitive and procreative dimensions or 
meanings of human sexuality has been a central feature of Roman 
Catholic moral doctrine. 3 Artificial contraception is rejected because it 
separates the love-union and procreation. IYF also entails the separation 
of love-union (sexual intercourse) and procreation (in the petri dish). 
Must, then , I Y F be rejected on the same grounds? 
Before dealing with the question of IYF it will be necessary to analyze 
some of the more general issues which recent discussion has brought to 
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light. I believe one of the most important is the alleged presence of a form 
of "dualism" in some of the arguments which have been presented . As a 
first step, therefore, I will attempt to sketch out the main outlines of this 
problem. 
Integral Humanity vs. Dualism 
Throughout its history, the tradition which concerns us here has often 
had to struggle with various forms of "dualism." It has been constrained to 
resist tendencies to split apart soul-body and to uphold the integrity of the 
human. Some philosophies and theologies have exalted the spirit or mind 
and devalued the body. Others have elevated the physical at the expense of 
the spirit. This problem appears in contemporary discussions of the 
Roman Catholic tradition, but is presented in two quite different ways . 
There is, on the one hand , a critique of certain traditional positions on the 
grounds that these are based on a form of dualism which separates 
rationality and animality in the human.4 The burden of the charge is that 
these positions accord a morally definitive meaning to the physical 
structures of humanity, prior to and apart from the rational or spiritual. 
For the sake of brevity, this position will be referred to as "physicalist 
dualism." 
Argument Challenges Dualism 
A second argument challenges a kind of dualism which equates the truly 
human with rational consciousness , or with what can be consciously 
experienced. This kind of dualism, it is argued , reduces the bodily to the 
merely biological , that is , to the subpersonal, subhuman level. The bodily, 
and , specifically, the procreative aspect of human sexuality, is thus 
reduced to the level of the merely instrumentaJ.5 In such a view, the bodily 
aspect has no inherent moral significance, apart from its capacity to be 
used instrumentally for the purposes of the rational agent. Perhaps we 
could name this "instrumental dualism." We could construct two different 
forms of argument corresponding to the two distinct types of dualism. The 
first argument would be based on the premise that the physical, biological 
structure itself sets the moral norm. The second would take its foundation 
on the presumption that the physical , biological structure in itself has no 
moral significance. The first type of argument would reject IVF on the sole 
ground of the physical separation of sexual union and procreation. The 
second argument would justify IVF on the ground that the separation is , in 
itself, morally neutral and is given its moral meaning by the end intended . 
An argument of the first kind would be open to the objections directed 
against "physicalist dualism."6 On the other hand, an argument of the 
second kind would be exposed to objections that it rests on the 
presupposition of "instrumental dualism." Neither form of argument 
seems to take adequate account of integral humanity. 
The next question to be asked is whether the relevant teaching of the 
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Magisterium rests on the sole ground of the physical inseparability of 
sexual union and procreation. In the analysis which follows, I will argue 
that it does not. Together with this, it must also be asked whether those 
who have argued for IYF under some conditions, do so on the grounds 
that bodily and physical sexuality has no significance which is morally 
relevant. In particular, do they hold that the separation of sexual union 
from procreation is neutral from a moral perspective?7 
Integral Humanity in the Teaching of the Magisterium 
To resolve the fundamental problem, we need some way of 
conceptualizing integral humanity in such a way as to display the complex 
variety of relevant features and their connection with one another. 
Further, we need to explain why it is that this integrated humanity has 
morally normative status . I suggest that this notion of integral humanity 
is not fully clear and that at least some of the difficulties of the present 
debate may arise from this lack. In what follows, I will suggest some ways 
towards a clarification of this point. 
It has been common to express this complex of integrated elements in 
terms of a "design." Thus, authors commonly spoke ofthe "natural design 
of the act ," or the "divine design." However, there are further questions to 
be asked as to (I) what are the relevant elements of this design? (2) what is 
the unifying principle of the design? and (3) why is that the design has the 
normative moral significance? In other terms, why is it wrong to disrupt it? 
Pius XII indicated at least the principle elements of the design when he 
stated that: 
A child is the fruit of conjugal union when this union is fully expressed by 
the bringing into play of the organic functions and the sensory emotions 
attached to them, and of the spiritual and disinterested love which 
animates this union. It is in the unity of this human act that the biological 
conditions of generation must be posited. 8 
The elements identified here are: (I) the physical sexual act (organic); (2) 
the biological conditions of generation (union of sperm and ovum, etc.); 
(3) the emotional elements of the union; (4) the spiritual elements (the love 
which is expressed in the act which we could perhaps rephrase as 
interpersonal love, reaching out towards a child to be loved) . This would 
seem to be an adequate account of what is involved. 
What is the unifying principle which links all these features together? In 
this and other statements, Pius XII spoke of several such unifying features: 
(I) the natural structure of the act; (2) the nature of the agents; (3) the 
nature of intercourse as mutual gift in "one flesh", (4) the moral act which 
draws all together. Finally, he mentioned several grounds for the 
normative status of this integrated design: (I) the will and plan of the 
Creator; (2) the dignity of the marriage partners; (3) their bodily and 
spiritual nature, (4) the requirements of the development of the child; (5) 
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what is willed by nature; (6) the rights which husband and wife give each 
other. 9 Clearly, Pius did not assert that the sole ground which established 
the normativity of the integral process was the physical structure of the act. 
In his encyclical "Humanae Vitae," Paul VI wrote of the integrally 
human, and the integral human vocation. 10 He then went on to explain this 
in terms of the nature of conjugal love. This has its origin in God. Couples 
participate in this love by mutual self-giving which is proper and exclusive 
and by which they pursue the personal communion by which they perfect 
each other, and are associated with God in the task of procreating and 
educating living beings. The necessary qualities of this love are then 
explained as fully human, complete (a special form offriendship), faithful, 
exclusive, and fruitful. 11 Further, when it is explained how this love is to be · 
expressed in the task of responsible parenthood , further features are 
included. For example, in regard to the biological processes , conscious 
parenthood entails the knowledge of and respect for their functi·ons, since 
human reason discerns in the faculty of procreating life, laws which pertain 
to the human person. 12 This, of course, brings us directly to the much 
debated questions ofthe natural law and its significance for papal teaching 
on sexuality and procreation. 
Most recently, in an address on this subject, Pope John Paul II again 
presented, as the central issue, integral humanity or, in his terms , "the unity 
of (man's) personal being."13 The Pope stated that the central issue was 
consistency with a Christian view of sexuality as an expression of conjugal 
love. "For sexuality reflects the innermost being of the human person as 
such, and is realized in a truly human way only if it is an integral part ofthe 
love by which a man and a woman commit themselves totally to one 
another until death."14 
A Basis for Agreement Within the Tradition 
In these accounts, it is clear that the physical integrity of he act of sexual 
intercourse is not the sole ground of the moral norm. In order to make this 
extensive range of other factors more manageable, we could perhaps 
group them together as : (I) love values; where the significant feature is the 
integrity of marital, inter-personal, parental love; (2) dignity values; where 
the concern would be the personal dignity of husband, wife and the child 
and also that of other persons who may be involved (e.g. , donors); (3) 
bodily values, where the issue would be the integrity of the bodily 
processes and actions involved. 
The love values relate to the intentions of those concerned and to 
deliberately adopted attitudes towards others. One party might 
deliberately withhold love from the other, or one or both adopt an attitude 
of rejection of love to the child who might be conceived. In such a case, the 
choice to pursue IVF would clearly be morally vitiated at root. The dignity 
values relate to the intentions and attitudes of those concerned and to the 
quality of their relationships to one another. It would be possible that 
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the wife might be regarded as a mere "instrument" in the process (e.g. , as 
mere provider of ova and womb). Or the husband might be regarded as 
mere instrument (e .g., as provider of sperm). Or, finally, the child-to-be 
might be regarded as mere instrument (e .g. , for the satisfaction of egotistic 
desires on the part of the parents to achieve the satisfaction of having a 
child.)1 5 In these cases, the persons would not be loved for their own sake, 
but sought as mere means to some other end. 
As far as I am aware , both those who would accept IYF under certain 
conditions and those who would reject it absolutely would agree with 
what has been proposed here. Such a clear violation of love-value and l or 
dignity-values would constitute the choice morally wrong. It is at the point 
where the body-values are introduced into consideration that clear 
differences emerge. 
Points of Disagreement 
Three types of argument are presented. The first type would assert that 
since, on the physical level , I YF entails the separation of sexual intercourse 
and procreation, it is morally wrong precisely for this reason. Physical 
separation tout court constitutes the choice of the procedure morally 
wrong. 
The second type of argument does not claim that IYF is morally wrong 
merely because it entails the physical separation of sexual intercourse from 
procreation. Rather, it is argued that where a couple choose a procedure 
which deviates from the physically integral act, such a choice inevitably 
has negative implications for the dignity of the persons involved, the 
quality and dignity of their relationships to each other, and for the 
authenticity of marititl-parentallove. On these multiple grounds , it is then 
judged to be morally wrong. 
The third type argues that physical separation of sexual intercourse and 
procreation cannot , of itself, constitute grounds for mor'll condemnation. 
Granted that the love values and dignity values are preserved in intention, 
these may be expressed and embodied in other choices of procedures 
besides the integral physical , sexual act. That is, it is asserted that authentic 
marital-parental love , expressed in such a way as to uphold the dignity of 
the persons concerned , need not be expressed only in the integral, physical 
sexual act. I now propose to examine each of these arguments in more 
detail. 
Type 1: Arguments from Physical Structure 
In this argument the morally relevant features are to be found in the 
physical structure of the act. Thus, the physical integrity of the act is given 
morally normative status. Further, it has this morally normative status 
because it is a (relatively) constant feature of human functioning and 
therefore must be presumed to reflect the design of the One Who created 
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the human organism. To violate the integrity of the structure of the act is , 
therefore, to violate the design of the creator. This "physicalist" 
interpretation of the natural law has been the subject of frequent 
criticism. 16 
Some recent authors have explicitly challenged this form of the natural 
law argument in its application to IYF and developed a case for the 
acceptance of the procedure. For example, John Mahoney, S.J. criticizes 
the questionable transition from fact to moral norm which the natural law 
argument seems to entail. He then questions the assumption that since the 
normal course of events is that natural intercourse is the means to 
procreation, this normal structure must also be the morally normative 
structure. Why, he asks , must natural intercourse be the only morally 
acceptable means of procreation? He goes on to query the presumed 
normative link between the normal structure of the loving procreative act 
and the design of the Creator. If God has created humankind with 
intelligence to control its environment and to discover means to ends , why 
is it, then, that other means to the end of procreation which human 
intelligence may discover are necessarily contrary to the design of the 
Creator? He does not , in effect, question the requirement of marital, 
interpersonal love between spouses , which reaches out towards a child to 
be loved. Rather, He asks why such a love may be embodied only in the 
normally structured act. Why may such love not be embodied in the 
complex of actions , decisions, burdens and sufferings which the couple 
undergo in seeking to conceive a child through IYF?1 7 
Some of these objections are, of course, commonly raised in debates 
about the "natural law." There are several points here which need 
attention. The first is the question as to why marital-parental love may be 
embodied only in the normally structured act. This is the right question 
and other recent articles have sought to address it. But there is a second 
point which is more problematical. This is the assumption that those who 
argue that such love cannot be embodied in procedureS other than the 
normally structured act, do so simply because they accept a physicalist 
understanding of the natural law argument. Thus , the argument is 
presumed to go as follows. Acts which deviate from the normally 
structured act are contrary to the design of nature and therefore morally 
wrong. Such morally wrong acts cannot embody and express rightly 
ordered love. There would be a contradiction between the rightly ordered 
love and the wrongly ordered acts . But is this, in fact , the only way in which 
the case against IYF can be made? In the following analysis of the second 
type of argument, I propose to show that it is not. 18 
Type 2: Arguments from Multiple Implications of 
Departure from the Natural 
As I have already stated , the official Church position does not make the 
physical separation the sole ground of moral objection to artificial 
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contraception. Nor is the 'separation considered merely as a separation of 
two physical events, sexual intercourse and procreation. Rather, the 
ground for moral objection is the separation of " ... the two meanings of 
the conjugal act: the unitive meaning and the procreative meaning."20 
Thus, the merely physicalist argument cannot claim the support from 
the authority of the Magisterial teaching. However, in the light of this , 
another important conclusion follows . It is sometimes presumed that the 
precise reason for the rejection of artificial contraception by the 
Magisterium was the mere physical separation of sexual union and 
procreation. On this same presumption, two different arguments might be 
developed. The first would be that, since there is also a separation of sexual 
union and procreation in the case of IVF, the latter must be rejected on 
exactly the same grounds. The second would challenge the adequacy of the 
rejection of artificial contraception on the grounds that the supporting 
reasons are "physicalist." Since this reasoning is alleged to fail , it is then 
further argued that the separation of sexual union and procreation in IVF 
cannot provide grounds for moral rejection (in principle). Both these 
arguments are inadequate as I will seek to show by an analysis of a number 
of recent contributions to the debate . 
Francesco Giunchedi establishes the necessary basis for any further 
argument with an explicit rejection of dualism. As he correctly points out , 
the human person is an embodied subject; the body constitutes a part of 
the integral human subject. Whatever touches the human body inevitably 
touches the person. Since the human person is composed of spirit and 
body, the inherent finality or purpose of the body cannot itself be the 
ground of a moral norm except to the degree that reason discovers in it a 
significance. This significance carries a moral imperative insofar as it 
guarantees the fullness of human meaning in an action .21 
Integral humanity is construed here in terms of integral significance or 
signification. Where the integral significance is attacked, integral 
humanity is thereby attacked. The author then applie this to IVF. The 
separation of the unitive aspect and the procreative aspect of human 
sexuality violates integral signification and so violates integral humanity. 
But, according to Giunchedi , where the separation is brought about 
precisely to actualize procreation, the moral significance is different. 
Therefore , IVF cannot be judged morally in the same way as artificial 
contraception.22 
This argument seems to me to be fundamentally sound in its basic 
direction and intention. The argument that artificial contraception to 
avoid procreation and IVF to promote procreation have different moral 
meanings and must be judged differently also seems convincing. However, 
there is need for more explicit explanation of some of the links in the 
argument. How does reason go about establishing the precise nature ofthe 
"signification" of an act? Without a further explanation of this point, it is 
not clear why a separation of the exercise of sexuality and the event of 
conception necessarily separate the signification of the unitive and 
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procreative. If the normal physical, biological link between the two 
immediately established the necessary link between the two significations, 
the argument would stand. But that step would seem to take us back, after 
all, to identifying the physical structures with the structures of 
signification and so with the moral norm. The precise meaning of this 
intermediary notion of signification needs more explanation if the 
argument is to be completely convincing. Furthermore, why is it 
necessarily and absolutely required that every act have full human 
signification? 
John M. Finnis argues that the departure from the natural process of 
procreation is morally significant, not simply because it deviates from the 
physically normal, but because of its implications for the parent-child 
relationship. To choose to have a child by IYF is to choose to have a child 
as the product of a making. This choice structures the relationship of 
parents to child as one of a maker to product. A relationship of maker to 
product is inherently one of radical inequality and essential subordina-
tion. This does not mean, he is careful to point out, that the child has an 
objectively real different status. Rather, the structure of choices , " ... 
tends to assign (that) child, in its inception, the same status as other 
objects of acquisition."24 
A similar argument has been presented by Donald G. McCarthy and 
Edward J. Bayer. These authors argue that the child of technological 
intervention does not issue from normal human fertility and the 
procreative embrace of the parents. Thus, its origin is different in a radical 
way from that ofthe normal origin of a child. The nature of the harm to 
the child is expressed through the language of rights. The claim is made 
that every child has a natural right to fundamental security and self-
identity. This no one would dispute . The authors, however, extend the 
argument by proposing that the child has such a right to that kind of 
security which comes from generation through natural marital 
intercourse. Thus, it follows that every child who is copceived as the 
"product" of technology incurs a specific harm or "handicap." The choice 
of parents to conceive a child by such means involves the infliction of 
harm on the child , and violates the right it has to this specific form of 
security. They support their case by calling to mind our growing 
awareness of the problems which arise from disrupting the fundamental 
relationships of nature. It is granted that , so far, there is no empirical 
evidence for such a handicap. But they insist that such a handicap is 
objectively present whether or not it has any measurable effect on the 
child. 25 
Both these arguments postulate an objective harm to the child. But 
such an argument from a non-verifiable harm does not seem to be very 
strong. On the other hand, an argument based on the voluntary exposure 
of the infant to be conceived to the risk of harm would have much more 
force. 26 But in this case, the harm envisaged is a real, possible 
indentifiable damage to the child, which cannot be precluded. 
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Nevertheless, this type of argument is important in that it indicates a 
move away from a physicalist interpretation of the "natural design." 
What seems to be occurring in the debate is a move towards a more 
nuanced interpretation of the natural law which focuses on the 
interpersonal implications of deviation from the natural. 
Another form of argument has been developed by William E. May.27 
May's argument does not rest on the physical inseparability of the 
procreative and unitive . He challenges the positions of those who allege 
that the papal teaching itself erected physical separability of these 
elements into a moral norm . Thus, we may not take physical integrity of 
the marriage act as the determinative , morally relevant feature of the 
natural design . What , then , are the further significant features to which 
we must attend? May's argument confronts directly the proposal of John 
Mahoney, namely that marital / parental love may be embodied in a 
complex of choices and actions other than those choices and actions 
involved in the sexual union of spouses open to procreation . His case does 
not rest directly on a postulated harm to the child who may be conceived , 
but on the inherent character of the spouses' actions. According to May, 
the actions and choices of couples engaging in IYF are non-marital. Why 
is this so? In cases involving donors or vendors of sperm or ova, this 
would be clear. Similarly, IYF in the case of the non-married would be 
dearly non-marital. But the case is also made that, even for persons who 
are married, such choices and actions would be non-marital. 
What is the lack which constitutes these acts non-marital? It is not 
merely the lack of a physical conjunction of sexual union and 
procreation. It would seem to be rather the lack of actual embodiment of 
marital love in the procedure which leads to procreation. Couples are 
capable of sexual intercourse by the mere fact that they possess sexual 
organs . But they are capable of expressing marital / parental love only if 
they are actually committed to each other in marital love. It is only when 
that kind of committed love is actually embodied irf an act that it is a 
marital act. Thus , sexual intercourse between a couple who happen to be 
married , but who do not actually express their marital love in that act 
would , presumably, be a non-marital act in this sense. Why is it, then , that 
such marital / parental love cannot be embodied in acts other than the 
natural sexual union? There would seem to be a presupposition here 
which is not fully explained . May's argument seems to be that such acts 
might be accompanied by what the couple intend to be marital / parental 
love. But such acts cannot embody and express what is truly 
marital / parental love. Why is this? Perhaps there is presupposed here a 
notion of bodiliness as sacrament or symbol of the person, together with a 
notion of bodily union as sacrament or symbol of the marital love of 
persons. Other "embodiments" apart from sexual union are then, as it 
were , not "apt matter" for the "sacrament." Although this argument 
seems to need further development, the direction in which it moves is 
reasonably clear. It is an argument not from the nature of the act , or 
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from the nature of physical sexuality, but rather from the nature of 
personal marital love .28 It would seem to be a search for a way of 
overcoming the problem of dualism, not through a metaphysical 
explanation of the union of soul and body or rationality and physicality, 
but rather through an analysis of embodied love. 
Type 3: Arguments from the Structure of Relationships and 
Procreative Intention 
A common feature of this type is the argument that the kind of 
depersonalizing and instrumentalizing attitudes discussed previously 
could be present in the undertaking of IVF and ET and, if they were, this 
would mean a violation of love values and dignity values. In such a case the 
undertaking would be morally wrong. But this form of argument differs 
from type 2 in that it does not accept that the choice of alternative means of 
procreation (such as the technology of IVF) necessarily entails an attack 
on the love values or the dignity values. The essence of the argument is that 
authentic marital-parental love may be embodied in other choices and 
actions and in such a way that no violation of the dignity of the persons is 
inevitably involved. 
An example of this kind of argument has been proposed by Josef G. 
Ziegler.29 Ziegler's argument is founded on an interpretation of the integral 
structure of marriage. This structure, he explains , is an instance of the 
threefold , inter-connected relationship proper to any act , namely 
relationship to God, to neighbor and to self. This is founded on " .. . the 
being and meaning structure of created reality." The question then is : Is 
this relationship preserved in extra-corporeal generation? A Christian 
couple actualizes this relationship when they strive together to realize the 
sacramental imaging of the relationship of Christ to the Church in 
indissoluble marriage . Closely bound up with this is the actualizing of the 
individual element of marriage in partner love. This finds i~ starting point 
in recognition of the equal dignity of wife and husband. Thus they 
increasingly advance their own perfection as well as their mutual 
sanctification, and hence contribute to the glory of God.30 The cultic 
(God-oriented) and individual elements find their expression in the social 
component , the generation and education of children. An action within 
marriage is thus to be qualified as good if it corresponds to the principle of 
integration of these fundamental elements. 31 
Thus far, the analysis of the structure of created reality seems to prescind 
from the bodiliness of human created reality. However, this aspect does 
playa part in the argument. Ziegler considers IVF a form of therapy. The 
pathological defect in the otherwise naturally given connection between 
partnership and procreation is healed by an artificial connection. It is 
artificial but is, nevertheless, made possible by nature. Thus, it can be 
argued that the law of procreativity which God has established in human 
nature is preserved in this case. The element of interpersonal love can also 
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be retained , as can the "cultic" structure, because the medical intervention 
is understood as a fulfillment of the creative love of God .32 Thus, in this 
form of argument, the natural , bodily structure of human sexuality has 
significance for the moral evaluation of .IYF. The latter is morally 
acceptable insofar as it is "therapeutic" and made possible by "nature." 
Can this interpretation stand? It could be objected that IYF is not 
therapeutic in the proper sense since it does not heal the pathological 
condition. That remains after the use of IYF as before. Again , it could be 
argued that IYF does not assist the natural process but replaces it. 33 It 
would seem to be "therapeutic" only in the sense that it can produce the 
same results as the "normal" process . If this is what is meant, it would seem 
to represent a falling back into a form of "instrumental dualism." Since 
what is significant in the bodily structures is simply the capacity to produce 
the results (i .e., to reproduce) , when this capacity is absent, a procedure 
which produces that same result can be called "therapeutic" and is thus 
justifiable. Other implications of the procedure do not have moral 
relevance. 
The authors have something else in mind , however. The healing is 
directed not simply to the physical pathology, but rather to the totality of 
the continuing life of married love which is meant to , and in the case of this 
couple's intentions and desires actually does , reach out towards a child to 
be conceived and loved. The "pathology" in question is not merely physical 
damage, but a fracturing of this totality. The argument is , then, that the 
integral whole of the married project is damaged by lack of the capacity to 
conceive. Thus, the supplying of this capacity is "therapeutic" in respect to 
this total human reality. 34 Perhaps we could see here another attempt to 
overcome the problem of "dualism." Here the principle of unity is, again , 
not a metaphysical notion, but the historical continuity of the total project 
of committed married life, conjoining body and spirit in the intention to 
open marital parental love to the actual possibility of a child to be loved . 
However, there are serious lacunae in some of the arguments for the 
moral justification (under certain conditions) of IYF. These become clear 
in the light of the instance on the moral relevance of human bodiliness 
which the arguments of the second type correctly stress. Some authors 
explicitly reject dualism and affirm the corporeal nature of the human 
person.35 Others argue that, under certain conditions, external fecundation 
may be the prolongation of the sexual life of the couple. 36 But they, in fact , 
give little attention to the bodily nature of this sexual life, nor to the moral 
relevance of this corporeal dimension. Others recognize that IYF must be 
the last resort , thus apparently recognizing some moral significance in the 
"normal" processY But it is not adequately explained what the 
significance of the normal really is. While these arguments clearly do not 
assume that the bodily and , in particular, the link between sexual-union 
and procreation is neutral and has no significance for moral value, they do 
not provide any account of this presumed significance. They seem to 
assume that this dimension has value, though not an absolute value. But 
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until the grounding of this value is explained , this claim is an assertion , 
rather than a proven conclusion. 
What conclusions would follow from these analyses? On the level of 
fundamental principle, I would argue that the key point is the necessity of 
overcoming dualism (of whatever kind). A solution to the difficulties 
discussed here will be possible only in the light of a genuinely integrated 
understanding of humanity. On the level of moral conclusions, the matter 
is more complex. Some points , however, are clear. In terms of the present 
teaching of the Magisterium on the inseparability of the unitive-
procreative dimensions of human sexual expression, IYF (and ET) would 
not be morally justifiable. What, then , of the growing acceptance of 
artificial procreative techniques among many moral theologians? The 
issue I have tried to deal with here is the intrinsic adequacy of the 
arguments proposed. I would conclude that these arguments are, for the 
reasons explained, not adequate in themselves to sustain a convincing 
case. 
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